A Preliminary Look at Banks’ Balance Sheet Post Gap Law and Restructuring
Table 1:
| % | Dec. 2018 |
| BDL-Deposits/Assets | 76.7 |
| Deposits/Assets | 83.9 |
| Capital/Assets | 8.2 |
Table 2:
| Estimates ala Gap Law: | USD Billion |
| Customers’ Deposits After Anomalies | 60 |
| Customers’ Total $100,000 Deposits | 20 |
| Customers’ ABS Deposits | 40 |
Table 3:
| USD Billion | Dec. 2025 |
| BDL’s NFA | 9 |
| Banks’ Capital | 4.3 |
| Banks’ NFA | 6.3 |
Table 4:
| Estimates ala Gap Law: | USD Billion |
| Banks’ Share of $100,000 Deposits | 4.3 |
| Banks’ Share of ABs Deposits | 8 |
| PV of Banks’ Share of ABS Deposits | 4.5 |
Table 5:
| Banks’ BS Post Gap Law: USD Billion | |
| Assets | Liabilities |
| NFA: 2 | PV of ABS Deposits: 4.5 |
| PV of Banks’ Future ABS-based FA: 2.5 + 0.370 | Capital: 0.370 |
| Total: 4.870 | Total: 4.870 |
Source: BDL and author’s estimates
It should be widely understood by now that the Lebanese financial crisis started at BDL as it couldn’t repay banks their deposits, which constituted more than 76% of banks’ assets and 90% of banks’ customers’ deposits (see Table 1). Viewed as such, it is primarily the responsibility of BDL and the government to pay back depositors, not the banks!.
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